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Black Americans are a core Democratic constituency, despite holding views on
social issues that put them in conict with the party. Conventional wisdom attributes
this partisan commitment to the salience of race and concerns about racial inequality.
This paper considers whether the Democratic bias derives in part from low levels of
political knowledge. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study,
this paper examines how political knowledge moderates the relationship between social
issue cross-pressures and partisan attitudes among Black Americans. I demonstrate
that the extent to which Democratic allegiance persists despite policy disagreements
depends on whether blacks are suciently knowledgeable to act on their policy views,
and not simply on the importance that blacks assign to their racial commitments.
It is only among politically knowledgeable Black Americans that social issue cross-
pressures are at all politically consequential; for them, Democratic partisanship is
resilient but not immune to policy disagreements. For blacks with low levels of political
knowledge, partisan support is unaected by policy disagreements. This pattern is
most pronounced among religiously active Black Evangelicals, for whom social issues
are highly salient.
Keywords: Black Americans, race, party, political knowledge, social issues1. Introduction
Black Americans are a core Democratic constituency. As a group, they overwhelmingly
identify as Democrats, with many describing themselves as strong partisans. They consis-
tently support Democratic candidates, at rates (e.g. 88% for John Kerry, 95% for Barack
Obama) unrivaled by other Democratic segments of the population (e.g. women, working
class, Latinos), and at all levels of government. This pattern has been unbroken for well
over 40 years, since the Democratic and Republican parties polarized on the issue of race
in the mid- to late- 1960s. The conventional wisdom attributes this Democratic bias to the
salience of racial issues and concerns about racial inequality among Black Americans, and
to a widely shared conviction that as individuals they benet from eorts to advance the
interests of Blacks as a group.
As central as racial group interests are in Black Americans' thinking about politics,
however, they are not the only concerns. Black Americans care, sometimes a great deal,
about other issues. On some of these issues, their views are at odds with their commitments
to the Democratic Party. Witness, for example, Black mobilization in support of Proposition
8, a 2008 state ballot initiative that amended the California Constitution to prohibit same-
sex marriage. Yet, despite the dissonance, and to the consternation of the Republican Party,
Blacks remain overwhelmingly Democratic, in their self-identication, their vote choice, and
their aect toward partisan objects. It is possible that racial concerns are so dominant as
to render other issues politically inconsequential, at least with respect to partisan support.
That, in a nutshell, is the standard claim. But what I ask in this paper is whether part of
what sustains these Democratic commitments is simple ignorance. Is it possible that Black
Americans, no more informed about politics than other citizens, do not know the extent
to which their policy views put them in conict with their party or how to reconcile their
views with their partisan choice? Is it possible that low political knowledge, and not only
the bonds of race, helps to sustain Black Americans' Democratic commitments?
The goal of this paper is to identify the role of political information in Black partisanship.
1Specically, what I will examine is how political knowledge conditions the relationship be-
tween social issue cross-pressures and African American's partisan attitudes, including their
party identication, vote choice, and evaluations of political leaders. The analysis reveals
that the strength of Democratic allegiance, in the face of policy disagreement, depends on
whether Blacks are suciently knowledgeable to act on their policy views|not simply on
the importance that Blacks assign to their racial commitments. Black Americans whose
policy views put them at odds with the Democratic Party are less Democratic than Black
Americans in-line with the party, but only if they are highly politically informed.
2. Right Policy, Left Party and the Role of Political Information
Political observers have long recognized the socially conservative tendencies of the Black
mass public. In stark contrast to their views on racial and social welfare policy, African
Americans are rmly anchored to the political right of whites (and other minorities) on
a range of moral and cultural issues, including abortion, gay rights, and women's role in
society (Tate 2010; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Kinder 2001).1 In recent elections, Republican
candidates have sought to capitalize on this conservative strain|for example, by highlight-
ing so-called `pro-family' themes and support for faith-based initiatives|as part of their
courtship of minority voters, in the hopes of weakening the Democratic Party's hold on the
Black constituency (Smith 2005).
Yet, even as social issues have emerged as a polarizing force (at least among partisans)
in American politics (Abramowitz 2010), Republicans have largely failed to convert Black
social conservatism into greater support for their candidates or agenda. Blacks remain
reliably Democratic, despite opinions seemingly favorable to Republican policy initiatives|
an intransigence that Frymer (1999) and others have argued contributes to the group's
`electoral capture.' Insofar as `race remains the central factor in Black partisan decision
1Tate (2010) argues that Blacks are becoming more conservative on social welfare issues. But, on balance,
they remain liberal, when viewed relative to whites and relative to their opinions on social and cultural issues.
2making,' as Hajnal and Lee (2011, 143) conclude, the limited receptivity to the Republican
party is unsurprising. Just as civil rights were critical in wooing the the last Black Roosevelt
Republicans to the Democratic Party in the 1960s (Tate 2010), persistent concerns about
racial inequality undercut support for a party whose social conservatism stands alongside
racial policy positions that are viewed as anathema to Black interests.2
Black Americans may stand out as a particularly striking example of weak policy{party
linkage, but they are not unique. Two generations of scholarship have repeatedly armed
Converse (1964)'s early insight: `...for the public, in sharp contrast to the elite, party pref-
erence seems by and large to be set o in a belief system of its own, relatively unconnected
to issue positions' (1964, 229). Converse reached this conclusion when comparing the `frag-
mented and chaotic' political belief systems of a cross-section of the national electorate to the
`constraint and organization' of an elite sample of 1958 Congressional candidates (Converse
1964, 228-231). Even within the national electorate itself, however, contemporary scholars
have uncovered considerable variation in the degree to which policy views align with par-
tisan preferences, with political knowledge emerging as an important moderator (Althaus
2003; Bartels 1996; Claassen and Highton 2009; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gilens and
Murakawa 2002; Kam 2005). Members of the mass public dier in the amount of political
information they have, whether that is knowledge about the nature of partisan cleavages
(Gilens and Murakawa 2002; Kam 2005; Lauderdale 2010), about the roles and responsi-
bilities of prominent public gures or branches of government (Althaus 2003; Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996), about policy-relevant facts (Gilens 2001), or about public aairs in gen-
eral (Bartels 1996). The quality and quantity of political information one holds, together
with how that information is organized, are attributes associated with a wide variety of
behavioral dierences|from the style (and outcome) of political decision-making to the sus-
ceptibility to campaign inuences, stability of attitudes, and levels of political participation
2Although FDR secured more than two-thirds of the Black vote in his election bids, the majority of
African Americans continued to self-identify as Republicans (Hajnal and Lee 2011). As late as 1960, nearly
a quarter of Black respondents to the American National Election Study described themselves as Republican.
3(Galston 2001; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1993; Zaller 1992). Put simply, the politically
knowledgeable are dierent from the rest of the electorate. Among those dierences is that
individuals who are more informed about politics are more likely to exhibit issue proles
that are consistent with their partisanship (Claassen and Highton 2009; Lauderdale 2010).
For the most informed citizens, opposing policy views are mirrored in opposing partisan
preferences. In fact, Lauderdale (2010) nds that individuals who are `fully informed' about
partisan cleavages sort themselves across parties by policy opinion as thoroughly as members
of the Senate. By comparison, for those who are uninformed about partisan cleavages, there
is little evidence of sorting behavior; issue positions and partisan proles do not overlap. To
wit, knowledge is critical in the policy-party link.
Most of what we know about the consequences of low political knowledge comes from the
study of white public opinion (but see Bartels (1996); Kuklinski and Hurley (1994)). More-
over, the insights that have emerged from this vast literature, by and large, have not been
integrated into the research on black partisanship. But African Americans, too, are dieren-
tially exposed to political information, making it quite likely that the `thesis of universally
low mean sophistication' applies to them as well (Luskin 1987, 886). Additionally, infor-
mation inequalities among the black mass public may be particularly large with respect to
information about partisan cleavages on non-racial policies. To the extent that Blacks draw
much of their political information from `bibles, barbershops, and BET' (Harris-Lacewell
2004), and have more limited contact with mainstream political and social institutions, the
information they receive is skewed heavily toward a racially oriented analysis of politics
and public aairs (Dawson 1994). Not only is this analysis likely to dierentiate between
Democratic and Republican advocacy on racial issues, but it likely spends more time doing
that then highlighting partisan cleavages on topics such as abortion, gay rights, or school
prayer. When Black Democratic legislators appear on Tavis Smiley, for example, it is not
to discuss Democratic eorts to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act.3 Whereas awareness
3A notable exception to the lack of direct Black leadership on social issues is Julian Bond's 2009 speech
at the National Equality Rally in which he equated homophobia to racism and declared that `no people of
4of Republican opposition to minority set-asides is widespread (Zaller 1986), many Blacks
may not know that congressional Republicans favor a constitutional amendment to ban gay
marriage.4 Black Americans may be less likely to possess the knowledge necessary to link
social policy and party, because they are less likely to be exposed to it. With social and
cultural issues treated as `secondary to an agenda focused on Black civil rights and social
welfare' (Tate 2010, 98), Black Americans may hear (and absorb) relatively few elite political
arguments on these topics. In short, channels of political communication within the black
mass public foster a shared understanding of the political implications of blacks' racial com-
mitments, even while obscuring the potential relevance of other values and considerations.
Forty years of research on political knowledge suggest that such information asymmetries
probably contribute to the weak link, among blacks, between opinion on social issues and
partisan attitudes.
Where Black Americans may deviate from the patterns revealed by the study of white
public opinion is in the extent to which information moderates the policy-party link. Re-
search in black politics demonstrates clearly that racial group concerns are highly salient
in black political decision-making; such concerns are likely to constrain, if not necessarily
negate, information eects for blacks to a degree that they do not for white Americans.
Even among the most well-informed blacks, unlike the most well-informed white Americans,
(conservative) social issue positions may be only modestly related to (pro{Republican) par-
tisan attitudes. Blacks' Democratic allegiance is probably more resilient than prior research
on political information might predict. Rather than partisan defection, for blacks, political
information may contribute to an attenuation in positive partisan aect.5
Thus, the intuition that motivates this paper draws together insights from two litera-
good will should oppose marriage equality.'
4Zaller (1986) nds that `blacks, although tending to score lower than whites on other information scales,
score higher on race information' (1986, 6).
5Hajnal and Lee (2011) document a growing propensity among Blacks to reject partisan labels altogether
and self-identify as Independents. This rejection, they argue, is motivated not by views on moral and
social issues but by perceptions of waning Democratic advocacy on racial issues. Notably, their analysis
of relationship between partisan identication and social issues, such as gay rights, does not take political
information into account.
5tures that rarely intersect|research on political knowledge that is often silent on race and,
consequently, may overstate the role of information for blacks; research on black partisan-
ship that is often silent on political information and, consequently, may overstate the role of
race. Taken together, these literatures predict that, given more information about partisan
cleavages on social issues, African Americans with conservative policy views should evaluate
the Democratic party and political actors less favorably, and the Republican party more
favorably, than African Americans with liberal policy views. In the absence of political in-
formation, the generally positive orientation toward the Democrats and negative orientation
toward the Republicans should be shared by socially liberal and socially conservative African
Americans alike. Furthermore, the alignment of policy and partisan views should be more
sensitive to levels of political information for whites than it is for blacks.
3. Data and Methods
The data I use for this paper come from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study. I
draw specically on the national rolling cross-section, consisting of daily surveys conducted
from October 7,2003{November 16,2004. These data are valuable as they include a very
large sub-sample of Black respondents (N=6550). For analysis that relies on segmenting
the Black population along several dimensions|policy views, levels of information|a large
sample of respondents is critical.
The 2004 NAES includes a number of indicators that measure partisan attitudes, policy
views, and political knowledge. In addition to a seven-point party identication measure
(Party ID: 1 `Strong Republican' to 7 `Strong Democrat') and indicators of presidential
vote intention (Bush Vote) and job approval (Bush Job: 1 `Approve' and 0 `Disapprove'), I
construct a dependent variable from the respondents' evaluations of the Democratic (John
Kerry) and Republican (George Bush) presidential nominees along several dimensions: over-
all favorability; cares about people like you; inspiring; leadership; trust; shares your values;
knowledgeable. On each dimension, respondents scored the party nominees on an 11-point
6scale, ranging from 0 (unfavorable opinion) to 10 (favorable opinion). I calculated the av-
erage of the scores to measure the respondent's general aect toward each candidate. I
use the dierence between the average Bush and Kerry scores to assess relative favorability
(Bush{Kerry Favorability: -10 Pro-Kerry to +10 Pro-Bush).6
The policy domain where Black opinion is most at odds with the Democratic Party con-
cerns social issues such as abortion, gay rights and women's role in society. Perhaps not
surprisingly, given high levels of Black religiosity, many Black Americans hold conserva-
tive social views. To measure opinion on social issues, I leverage a range of survey items,
beginning with direct measures of policy support for abortion rights (Abortion), same-sex
marriage (Gay Marriage), and school vouchers (Vouchers). More than a quarter of Black
NAES respondents favor a total ban on abortion; nearly 40 percent favor a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage; and 55% support federal provision of vouchers `to
help parents send their children to private schools.' In addition to these three direct policy
items, I also draw on items that measure respondents' more general orientation toward so-
cially progressive politics. As a broad indicator of views regarding women's role in society, I
use the favorability of `feminist organizations' (Favor Feminists), a constituency recognized
as advocates for gender parity and allied with the Democratic party (Green, Palmquist and
Schickler 2004). Similarly, to gauge attitudes toward gay rights in general (as opposed to
only same-sex marriage in particular), I use the favorability of `gay and lesbian organiza-
tions' (Favor Gay Groups). Finally, I include responses to an item asking respondents to
describe their `political views,' (Ideology) with responses on a ve-point scale ranging from
`very conservative' (1) to `very liberal' (5).7
6The Bush{Kerry Favorability scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .90, indicating high reliability. The relia-
bility coecients for the constituent scales are .93 (Kerry items) and .92 (Bush items).
7Ideology and Gay Marriage are the only items that were included in each wave of the NAES rolling cross-
section, from October 7,2003{November 16, 2004. The schedule for the other items was as follows: Abortion
(10/7/03-9/20/04); Vouchers (10/7/03-9/19/04); Favor Feminists (10/7/03-6/24/04, for two-thirds of the
sample; 6/25/04-8/19/04, for one-quarter of the sample); Favor Gay Groups (10/7/03-6/24/04, for two-
thirds of the sample; 6/25/04-9/19/04, for one-quarter of the sample) Other social policy items, e.g. stem
cell research, available in the NAES were not included in this analysis because the items appeared in too
few waves and/or were asked of only a small subsample of the black respondents.
7Following Bartels (1996) and others, I measure levels of political knowledge using the
survey interviewer's assessment (Treier and Hillygus 2009). The measure reects a broad
judgment, reached by the interviewer at the conclusion of the survey, about `how knowl-
edgeable the respondent was about politics.' Zaller (1986), in a detailed analysis of a sim-
ilar measure on the American National Election Study, showed interviewer ratings to be
`highly eective as measures of political information,' comparable in discriminating power
to a `Cadillac information scale' constructed from 27 dierent factual knowledge questions,
and `essentially free of contamination by interviewers who might be biased in favor of higher
status respondents.' Similarly, Luskin (1987, 885) demonstrates that even for his most elabo-
rate information scale, built from more than 30 objective indicators, one of the most strongly
correlated criterion variable is the interviewer rating (r=.60), second only to placement of
political actors on the liberal{conservative spectrum (r=.73). In addition to their general
reliability as measures of political knowledge, the interviewer ratings are useful proxies in this
analysis since the NAES rolling cross-section includes few factual knowledge questions asked
across multiple waves of the survey. Political knowledge ratings based on responses to the
four factual questions asked most often can be constructed for only a small subset (N=2463)
of the NAES Black respondents. For this subset, the four-item factual knowledge score and
the interviewer rating correlate at .49, a predictably weaker correlation than Luskin (1987) or
Zaller (1986) uncovered using their more robust, multi-item factual knowledge scales.8 The
interviewer ratings, which are available for every NAES respondent and have been shown to
be both valid and ecient, are preferable to the four-item scale as a measure of respondents'
general political knowledge.9
8The Cronbach's alpha for the four-item factual knowledge scale is .58.
9I have replicated this analysis using respondents answers to the series of four factual knowledge questions.
(The factual knowledge questions asked the respondent to identify then-Vice President Dick Cheney; the
role of the Supreme Court; the votes required to override a presidential veto; and the majority party in
the House of Representatives.) The results are substantively unchanged, though more pronounced. Althaus
(2003) constructs knowledge scales that combine the subjective interviewer assessment with factual items
(see also Claassen and Highton (2009); Zaller (1992)). A similar approach, if pursued here, would reduce the
sample size by two-thirds, from 6550 to 2463 black respondents. The reliability of interviewer ratings makes
that approach unnecessary.
8The main disadvantage of the interviewer assessment is its generality. The rating is an
imprecise measure of the specic type of political knowledge|namely, knowledge of parti-
san cleavages on social issues|that I theorize moderates the relationship between African
Americans' partisan commitments and their policy views. Measures of respondents' ability
to discern the dierences in the social issue positions of the major parties and candidates
are available for only 12% of black NAES respondents, too few to permit meaningful sta-
tistical analysis.10 However, Zaller (1986)'s evidence suggests that a respondent's level of
political information `is a relatively general trait,' such that `someone who is well-informed
on one subject is very likely to be well-informed on others as well.' From this he concludes
that a general-purpose information scale, like interviewer assessment, can be as eective as
domain-specic information measures. By this logic, it is reasonable to believe that a re-
spondent viewed as well-informed across the wide range of political subjects covered in the
NAES interview, is likely to be well-informed on political subjects not covered, such as party
positions on issues like abortion, gay rights and women's role in society.
The interviewer's letter-grade assessment of knowledge was on a ve-point scale, ranging
from 1 (`F,' low knowledge) to 5 (`A,' high knowledge). The grade distribution for black
respondents has a mean of 3.51 (between a `B' and a `C'), with a majority of the respondents
(61%) clustered in the middle regions, receiving scores of 3 or 4. About 18% of respondents
were clustered in the two lowest knowledge categories, with grades of `D' or `F.' The distri-
bution is not so negatively skewed as to raise concerns about ceiling eects from high average
information scores. Also, consistent with earlier studies (Althaus 2003; Bartels 1996; Luskin
1987; Zaller 1986), a regression of interview ratings on demographic and political variables
nds that scores correlate predictably with education, income, gender, political interest,
political discussion, voter registration and turnout.11
In the analysis below, I report the results of models in which partisan attitudes are
10In a few waves of the survey (between 9/21/04{11/16/04), a random subset of the cross-section was asked
about the positions of presidential candidates on abortion. Eight hundred and forty-seven Black respondents
received this question.
11Analysis available from author upon request.
9regressed on social issue opinions and political knowledge. For the binary dependent variables
(Bush Vote, Bush Job) I estimate logit models; for Party ID and Bush|Kerry Favorability,
I estimate OLS models. Each regression model includes only one of the six social issue
indicators as a predictor. Excluded from the models are other attitudinal variables that are
not plausibly exogenous to levels of political information or to the given social issue under
study; by omitting such variables we capture the full `eect' of a given social issue, conditional
on information.12 Each model includes controls for demographic covariates (Gender,Age,
Education, Income), as they are relatively stable features of a respondent's makeup and may
bear on their partisan attitudes, and for interview date. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics
on all measures, stratied by interviewer's assessment of the respondent's level of political
knowledge.
[Table 1 about here.]
4. How Information Moderates the Policy-Party Link
When examined in the aggregate, without taking levels of political knowledge into ac-
count, there is little relationship between Blacks' social issue positions and their partisan
attitudes. This correlational pattern is evident in Figure 1 (a){(d), which report the change
in expected partisan identication (a), candidate favorability (b), presidential job approval
(c) and vote choice (d) given a change in policy view from the 25th percentile to the 75th
percentile position, with demographic covariates (gender, age, education, income) and in-
terview date held constant at mean values.13 A label next to each point estimate identies
the policy area. Not only do African-American partisan attitudes exhibit a strong pro-
12These parsimonious models are not meant to predict individual-level partisan attitudes. Rather, the
models are intended to capture dierences in partisan attitudes between social conservative and social liberals,
under conditions of low- or high-information.
13Each graph reports the rst dierences simulated based on the results from six separate regressions,
each estimating the relationship between a given partisan attitude (e.g. Party ID in Figure 1(a)) and one
of the social issue indicators, controlling for demographic covariates and interview date. To avoid out-of-
sample predictions, I simulate rst dierences using values that appear in the dataset (i.e. the 25th and 75th
percentile positions), rather than the minimum and maximum of a given scale.
10Democratic/anti-Republican bias in general (i.e. see sample means in Table 1), this bias
persists even among those who hold conservative views on social issues. The rst dierences,
and accompanying 95% condence intervals, are near zero in almost every case, indicating
that there is little to no change in partisan attitudes as abortion (abort), gay marriage
(marr) or school voucher (voucher) views change from liberal to conservative; as opinion
about feminists (fem) and about gay and lesbian groups (gays) change from less to more
favorable; and as self-described ideology (ideo) changes from `liberal' to `conservative.' This
pattern of small dierences between social liberals and social conservatives is consistent with
the claim that racial concerns are highly salient, perhaps dominant, in African Americans'
political decision-making.14
[Figure 1 about here.]
However, once you separate the relationship of policy views to partisan attitudes among
the politically informed from the same relationships among the uninformed, we begin to
see the extent to which the strength of Democratic commitments is sustained not only by
the bond of race, but also by low knowledge. I estimated a series of models that included,
in addition to the measures of information and policy views, the interaction of views and
information.15 (The models also controlled for gender, age, education, income and inter-
view date.) Information, measured by the interviewers assessment of respondent political
knowledge, enters the models as four indicator variables (with low knowledge, `F,' as the
omitted category), each interacted with policy views, thus allowing for the possibility that
the policy{party relationship does not vary monotonically with information.
As a rst test of whether information moderates policy{party relationships, I compare the
t of the unrestricted models, which include information and policy{information interaction
14The 2004 NAES did not include items measuring racial attitudes (e.g racial linked fate). As a result,
it is not possible to model the relationship between racial and partisan attitudes, and examine this claim
directly.
15A total of 24 models were estimated, six for each of the four dependent variables (Party ID, Bush Job,
Bush Vote, Bush{Kerry Favorability). In each of the six models, a given dependent variable was regressed
on either Abortion, Gay Marriage, Vouchers, Favor Feminists, Favor Gay Groups or Ideology, in addition to
information, the policy-information interaction terms, demographic covariates and interview date.
11terms, to the t of the earlier, restricted models, which excluded information (and the
interaction terms) from the set of predictors. I perform likelihood ratio tests to assess relative
t (Bartels 1996; Althaus 2003). In 16 out of 24 tests (67%), the unrestricted models that
allow for information eects produce statistically signicant improvements in t, at the p<.05
level, over models that exclude information. In other words, contrary to the assumptions
of the restricted model, informed and uninformed blacks often dier in the extent to which
they align their policy views and partisan attitudes. Of the partisan attitudes examined
here, likelihood ratio tests nd evidence of information eects most frequently in the models
predicting Bush{Kerry Favorability and Bush Job approval; in 12 of 12 tests of model t, the
observed dierence between the restricted and unrestricted models is statistically signicant
at the p<.05 level.16
To translate the regression results into quantities of interest, I simulate the dierence
in the partisan attitudes we would expect to observe if ideology or opinions on abortion,
same-sex marriage or school vouchers were more conservative, or if aect toward feminist
or gay and lesbian organizations were more favorable. In each simulation, views shift from
the 25th percentile position to the 75th percentile (while holding other covariates constant at
mean values). I simulate the change in expected value at each level of political knowledge. If
political knowledge moderates the policy{party relationship as hypothesized, then the size of
the simulated dierences should vary with political knowledge, with larger dierences among
those with higher levels of information.
Figure 2 reports the expected change in party identication (Party ID) associated with
a 25th{to{75th percentile change in social views, for each social view (ideo, abort, marr,
voucher, fem, gays)|for the `whole sample' of Black respondents (at top of graph) and
for Black respondents at each level of political knowledge. In addition to the point estimates,
the graph also depicts the 95% condence intervals for the estimates. The graph reveals that
16For the models of Party ID, 3 of 6 likelihood ratio tests identify statistically signicant dierences in
the t of restricted and unrestricted models; for Bush Vote, 1 of 6 tests identify statistically signicant
improvements in model t.
12the policy{party correlation is strongest among the highly informed. For African Americans
at the lowest two levels of political knowledge|those who earned grades of `D' or `F' from
their survey interviewers|social views and party identication are unrelated to one another.
Point estimates of the expected change in party identication associated with a change in
social views are at or near zero in almost every case, and the 95% condence intervals
consistently include zero. By comparison, among the most informed Blacks (i.e. those who
earned grades of `A' or `B'), a change in social conservatism across the inter-quartile range is
associated with a statistically signicant change in party identication in almost every case.
Ideology, abortion views and aect toward feminist organizations stand out in particular for
their relationship to party identication among the politically knowledgeable. For the most
knowledgeable Blacks, holding other covariates constant at mean values, party identication
changes by -.73 [-.91,-.55] when self-described ideology changes from `liberal' to `conservative';
by -.41 [-.61,-.20] when abortion views change from `strongly oppose' to `somewhat favor' a
total ban; and by .35 [.19,.53] when the favorability of feminist organizations increases by
three points, on a scale from 0 to 10. These dierences, together with dierences associated
with changes in the favorability of gay and lesbian organizations and in support for same-sex
marriage and school vouchers, though substantively modest, are nonetheless consistent with
the claim that the alignment of party and social issue positions depends on information.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figures 3 { 5 display the expected dierences and 95% condence intervals for the other
three partisan attitudes|Bush-Kerry Favorability, Bush Job, Bush Vote. A consistent pat-
tern emerges. At low levels of political knowledge, Black (social) liberals and conservatives
are indistinguishable in their job approval ratings (Figure 4) and electoral support (Figure 5)
for Bush. Furthermore, these politically distinct, though equally poorly informed, groups
are similar in their judgements about the favorability of President Bush relative to John
Kerry (Figure 3). With point estimates and condence intervals consistently at or near zero,
the results make clear that views on social issues|from opposition to gay marriage and
13abortion rights to support for school vouchers to disapproval of feminist and gay and lesbian
organizations|are not predictive of partisan attitudes among those Black respondents who
earned knowledge grades of `D' or `F.' But as we move up the grade scale to the segment of
politically knowledgeable Blacks, point estimates and condence intervals move away from
zero: Just as informed social liberals and conservatives dier in their party identication
(Figure 2), they also dier from each other in their evaluations of and electoral support for
Bush. For example, for the most knowledgeable Blacks, a change in abortion views from
`strongly oppose' to `somewhat favor' an abortion ban increases the relative favorability of
Bush over Kerry (Figure 3) by 1.69 [1.22,2.15], on a scale from -10 to +10; the probability of
approving of Bush's job performance (Figure 4) by .11 [.07,.15]; and the probability of a Bush
vote (Figure 5) by .08 [.05,.12]. Across the 48 policy{party relationships examined among
the politically informed (Grade `A' or `B'), each estimated controlling for demographic co-
variates and interview date, all but seven are statistically signicant. By comparison, of
the 48 policy{party relationships among the least informed (Grade `D' or `F'), all but 2 are
statistically insignicant. In short, African Americans whose views on social issues are at
odds with the Democratic Party, if they are knowledgeable enough to recognize the conict,
are less likely than their equally informed but more liberal counterparts to maintain strong
Democratic commitments. The partisan implications of policy views depend on political
knowledge.
[Figures 3 { 5 about here.]
5. When Information Matters Most
Black Americans whose social issue opinions put them at odds with the Democratic party
express weaker Democratic commitments, provided they are suciently politically informed.
But, when it comes to policy disagreement, are all Blacks equally responsive to political
information? Or, does the value of political information for bringing partisan and policy
views into alignment vary across individuals, in particular with the relative importance
14of social issues? Van Knippenberg and Daamen (1996) identify motivation as critical to
information-processing, showing that individuals who are more involved with an issue are
more likely to use information in order to form stable and consistent policy preferences on
that issue. Thus, we might reasonably expect information to matter primarily for those
Black Americans for whom social issues like abortion and same-sex marriage are highly
salient; relative to others, this group is likely to be more concerned with reconciling their
partisan attitudes with their social views and, thus, more likely to use information to \get
it right"
To answer this question, I consider how information eects vary with church attendance
and religious tradition. In the absence of more precise measures of issue importance, I use
the frequency of church attendance and self-identication as a born-again or evangelical
Christian as indicators of the salience of social issues. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995,
Chapter 14) link church involvement not only to more conservative views on abortion (see
also Ellison, Echevarra and Smith (2005)), but also to a much greater propensity to engage
in issue{based political activity, one sign of issue importance; in fact, their `church variables'
are stronger predictors of participation in abortion{related politics than is holding extreme
views on this social issue. (Importantly, church activity does not predict greater political
engagement on other issues, such as education or social welfare.)17
For African Americans, church attendance alone may not be sucient as an indicator of
the importance of moral and social issues, as the dominant theological traditions in black
churches put a strong emphasis on socially progressive themes of fairness and equality (Harris
1999).18 The scriptural interpretations embraced by black Evangelicals, however, stress not
only the imperative of justice but also personal piety and moral conduct (McDaniel and
Ellison 2008). We might plausibly assume, therefore, that black Evangelical churchgoers will
17Analysis of Black NAES respondents demonstrates that frequent churchgoers are statistically signif-
icantly less likely to oer `Don't Know' or `Neither Favor Nor Oppose' responses to the policy items, a
pattern consistent with the higher salience of social issues among the religiously active. Regression results
available from author upon request.
18I credit an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
15be more concerned than others with issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage and more
committed to bringing their politics and their moral values into alignment (Layman 2001).
Thus, if issue importance matters, I expect information eects to be concentrated among
the 39% of NAES Black respondents who identify as born-again or evangelical Christians
and attend religious services at least once per week.19
Figures 6 { 9 report the results of regressions in which partisan attitudes were mod-
eled as a function of interactions between policy views, information and church attendance,
separately by religious tradition (born-again/evangelical or not). To simplify the three-way
interactions between policy, information and church attendance, I recoded the information
measure to two binary indicators: high knowledge (Grade `A' or `B'), low knowledge (Grade
`D' or `F'), with Grade `C' the excluded category. The graphs display the expected dier-
ence in partisan attitude associated with a change in policy view from the 25th percentile to
the 75th percentile position, given a particular level of church attendance|at least once per
week (solid dot), or less (hollow dot)|for high knowledge (solid lines) and low knowledge
(dash lines) respondents. In each graph, the left panel displays the expected dierences for
non-Evangelicals; the right panel, for Born-Again and Evangelical Christians.
[Figures 6 { 9 about here.]
Across each of the graphs, the patterns for black Evangelicals (right) and non-Evangelicals
(left), for frequent (solid dot) and infrequent (hollow dot) churchgoers are similar: At low lev-
els of political knowledge, the estimated change in partisan attitude associated with a change
in social issue position is typically at or near zero, with 95% condence intervals (dash lines)
that include zero. At high levels of political knowledge, the estimated change in partisan at-
titude is more often non-zero and statistically signicant (solid lines). These broad patterns
can be seen more clearly in Table 2, which summarizes, for each subgroup of respondents (as
dened by evangelicalism, church attendance and level of knowledge), the number of times
19Sixty-one percent of Black respondents identify as born-again or evangelical Christians, a gure consistent
with McDaniel and Ellison (2008, 182{183)'s claim that `African Americans are much more likely than Anglos
to hold orthodox theological beliefs.' Nearly two-thirds of black evangelicals report attending church one or
more times per week, compared with only 30% of non-evangelicals.
16that the expected dierence in partisan attitude associated with a change in policy view is
statistically signicant at the p< :05 level. (For each respondent subgroup, I calculate a
total of 24 (6 policy positions x 4 partisan attitudes) policy{party relationships.) Among
low-knowledge non-Evangelicals, at all levels of church attendance, only 4.2% of the (48) es-
timated policy{party relationships are statistically signicant, compared with 52.1% among
high-knowledge non-Evangelicals. For black Evangelicals, the dierence in the number of sta-
tistically signicant policy{party correlations between those who received knowledge grades
of `D' or `F' and those who received grades of `A' or `B' is also substantial: 10.4% versus
70.8%, respectively, of the policy{party relationships are statistically signicant. A similar
pattern holds if we disaggregate further to compare low- and high-knowledge respondents
within levels of church attendance. 20 In other words, for the politically uninformed, policy
views and partisan attitudes are almost always uncorrelated, even among those who presum-
ably care about getting it right (i.e. black Evangelicals, frequent churchgoers). And for the
politically informed, policy and party are typically correlated, even among those for whom
social issues are relatively less salient (i.e. black non-Evangelicals, infrequent churchgoers).
As a rule, the more African Americans know about politics, the more aligned are their policy
views and partisan attitudes.
[Table 2 about here.]
But while political knowledge matters in general, regardless of religious tradition or
frequency of church attendance, it matters more consistently for black Evangelicals than
it does for non-Evangelicals. Whereas nearly 71% of the policy{party relationships are
statistically signicant among high-knowledge Evangelicals, only 52% are signicant among
high-knowledge non-Evangelicals. Still further, it is the most committed black Evangelicals,
as measured by the frequency of church attendance, for whom information matters most
often. Ninety-ve percent (23 of 24) of the policy{party relationships among religiously
20For example, among low knowledge, low-church attendance Evangelicals, in only 1 of 24 cases is a change
in policy view associated with a statistically signicant dierence in partisan attitude. For high-knowledge,
low- church attendance Evangelicals the gure is 11 of 24.
17active, highly informed Evangelicals are statistically signicant, compared with 46% (11 of
24) among black Evangelicals who are less active but nonetheless highly informed. Thus,
the empirical results demonstrate that (1) knowledge matters, but (2) it matters most when
social issues are salient.
6. The Ties That Bind: Comparing Information and Race
To nd that dierences in social policy views are associated with statistically signicant
dierences in partisan attitudes, but only if blacks are suciently politically knowledgeable
(and especially when social issues are salient), demonstrates the importance of information
as a moderator in the policy{party relationship|a fact consistent with prior research on
political knowledge (Claassen and Highton 2009; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter
1996; Lauderdale 2010), though previously unrecognized in the literature on black partisan-
ship. Blacks' Democratic allegiance is, in part, a function of low information. At the same
time, for well-informed Blacks, the policy{party linkages are substantively modest|more
modest than the literature on information eects, based almost exclusively on the analysis
of white public opinion, might lead us to predict. Even the most strongly cross-pressured
Blacks|those who favor a total ban on abortion, oppose gay marriage, view feminists and
gay and lesbian activists unfavorably and so on|evince a pro-Democratic bias not that dif-
ferent from the attitudes of pro-choice liberals who favor marriage equality. As scholars of
black politics have long argued, this likely reects the continuing salience of race and racial
concerns in African-American political decision-making.
The 2004 NAES does not include items probing the racial attitudes of respondents, which
limits our ability to directly assess the extent to which such issues account for the resilience of
African Americans' Democratic commitments across information strata.21 However, we can
examine the policy{party relationship, and how it varies with political knowledge, among a
21The 2004 NAES includes neither measures of racial policy preferences (e.g. opinion toward armative
action) nor measures of racial group consciousness (e.g. racial linked fate).
18group for whom race is relatively less salient to political decision-making: white Americans.
If race is the reason we observe modest policy{party relationships even among politically
knowledgeable Blacks, then we should nd greater policy{party alignment among whites
than we do Blacks. That is, the change in partisan attitude associated with a change
in social issue positions should be substantively larger for the group less bound by racial
commitments.
Figure 10 reports the results of models that replicate for white respondents the main anal-
ysis conducted earlier for Blacks. In particular, each graph depicts the expected dierence in
partisan attitudes associated with a change in policy view from the 25th percentile to the 75th
percentile Black position, for white respondents at each grade-level of political knowledge.22
(I use the percentile benchmarks for Black respondents to facilitate comparison of the two
racial groups.) The shape of the graphs are quite similar to what was observed in the earlier
analysis (Figures 2 { 5); there is a consistent pattern of stronger policy{party relationships,
with point estimates and 95% condence intervals further away from the zero-line, at higher
levels of political knowledge. But, for our purposes, the critical dierence between the two
sets of gures is the magnitude of the policy{party correlations for whites as compared to
Blacks. A similar change in social policy opinion is associated with a much larger change
in partisan attitudes for whites than for Blacks. As one example, among the most informed
respondents (Grade `A'), a change in position regarding a constitutional amendment to ban
gay marriage from `strongly oppose' to `strongly favor' changes white partisan identica-
tion by -2.07 [-2.15, -1.99] on a seven-point scale, but Black partisan identication not at
all; whites' probability of approving of Bush's job performance by .46 [.44, .47], but Blacks'
probability by .10 [.06, .15]; whites' probability of voting for Bush by .50 [.48,.51], but Blacks'
probability by .10 [.06, .15]; and the relative favorability of Bush over Kerry among whites
by 5.86 [5.68, 6.03], but among Blacks by only 1.27 [.77, 1.77].
22The political knowledge scale for white NAES respondents has a mean (standard deviation) of 3.81
[1.03], with 65.5% of respondents scoring grades of A or B and 10.5% of respondents scoring grades of D or
F. (The gures for blacks are 53.5% and 17.9%, respectively.)
19[Figure 10 about here.]
The greater alignment of policy and party among whites than among Blacks, at every
level of political knowledge, is consistent with the claim that racial concerns loom large in
Black political decision-making; the salience of racial group interests inhibits partisan drift as
policy preferences diverge, and constrains information eects among blacks. Moreover, the
dierences in policy{party alignment between similarly-informed Blacks and whites, i.e. the
race `eect,' exceed the dierences between Blacks at the top and bottom of the knowledge
scale, i.e. the information `eect.' The implication is that race is a more signicant moderator
than is information in the policy{party relationship. Notably, these insights are revealed only
with the juxtaposition of white and black public opinion, an analytical perspective that is
as unusual in the literature on political knowledge as is attention to political knowledge in
the literature on black partisanship. The juxtaposition yields evidence that both arms
and challenges the core claims of these literatures: knowledge does matter for black partisan
attitudes, but it matters far less than it does for the (less racially-committed) white mass
public.
7. Conclusions
Opinions on social issues are relevant to Black partisan attitudes, but only when Blacks
are suciently knowledgeable to connect these views to partisan judgements. In the absence
of political knowledge, social issues have no partisan relevance, even among religiously ac-
tive black Evangelicals for whom issues such as abortion and gay rights are typically more
salient; a pro-Democratic bias can persist in spite of divergent social views. Information
magnies the partisan implications of social issue cleavages, as predicted in the literature
on political knowledge (Claassen and Highton 2009; Converse 1964; Lauderdale 2010). For
highly informed blacks, conservative [liberal] social issue positions are associated with less
[more] favorable attitudes toward the Democratic Party. This eect is not limited to com-
mitted Evangelicals but is most pronounced among them. While less informed Blacks are
20rmly anchored to the traditional group loyalties inherited from the civil rights period, the
well-informed appear more attentive to the social liberalism of the contemporary Democratic
party (Bartels 1996).
Low knowledge, however, is not the only force sustaining African Americans' Democratic
commitments. Even well-informed black social conservatives hold generally favorable views of
Democrats and unfavorable views of Republicans. True, policy cross-pressures impact black
public opinion, but only on the margins. It is likely that Black Americans' racial commit-
ments are what inhibit greater policy{party alignment on social issues, as argued by scholars
of black politics (Dawson 1994). Deep concerns over persistent racial inequality, together
with the belief that the Democratic Party is more supportive of the black agenda (Philpot
2007), may eectively override cross-pressures related to social issue positions. Comparisons
to white Americans, among whom we observe substantially more policy{party alignment at
all levels of political knowledge, underscore the centrality of race as an animating force in
Black partisan attitudes. The ndings lay bare the limits on Republican eorts to recruit
African Americans into the party. The challenge is not simply to boost awareness of shared
values on social and cultural issues (particularly among committed black Evangelicals); such
policy agreements are associated with only small, albeit statistically signicant, dierences in
partisan judgments. Knowledge helps, but in the end recruitment may depend on a `return
of the party of Lincoln' (Philpot 2007). This practical insight emerges only when we bridge
two literatures|one on black public opinion, the other on political knowledge|that rarely
intersect.
Questions remain. The ndings from this research, based on evidence from the analysis
of observational data, can only establish the plausibility of an information hypothesis, i.e.
that more information about the nature of partisan cleavages would lead to greater social
policy{party alignment. Without the benet of experimental data, it is not possible to iso-
late the causal eect of information, as decisions about whether to become informed about
politics may be endogenous to political beliefs or other relevant background characteristics.
21Without measures of information-holding more precise, and less subjective, than interviewer
ratings, it is not possible to distinguish the eects of factual information about party posi-
tions from the broader eects of the distinctive cognitive styles and information-processing
strategies adopted by politically knowledgeable citizens (Althaus 2003; Sniderman, Brody
and Tetlock 1993; Zaller 1992).23 The most well-informed black respondents on the NAES,
as judged by the survey interviewers, may not only know more about politics than others,
they may be more sophisticated in their thinking about politics as well. Finally, given data
in which positions on social issues and partisan attitudes are measured simultaneously, it
remains unclear whether partisan evaluations follow policy opinions, or the reverse. Either is
technically possible. Gilens and Murakawa (2002), in particular, presents experimental evi-
dence that partisan cues have causal eects on expressed policy preferences|that is, people
bring their policy views into line with their standing partisan commitments. This is likely
to be the case more generally for low-salience issues, such as food irradiation (Kam 2005).
Whether policy follows party on salient social issues such as gay marriage and abortion is
less clear. Nonetheless, relying on non-experimental, cross-sectional data limits our ability to
say conclusively whether information leads individuals to bring their partisan attitudes into
line with their policy views. More modestly, the ndings here demonstrate that individuals
who are more politically informed are more likely to reconcile their partisan and social issue
attitudes.
Future work should identify the causal eect of information-holding, by testing whether
informational interventions can reduce the discrepancies between Blacks' policy views and
their partisan commitments. Attention should focus, in particular, on providing experimental
subjects with information about the partisan alignment of social issues. Equally important
is the need for direct indicators of subjects' racial attitudes and beliefs, which I hypothesize
23The subjectivity of the interviewer ratings also means that it is not possible to establish with certainty
a respondent's command of factual information about politics, although factual knowledge and interviewer
ratings are shown above to be positively correlated (for the subset of respondents who were asked factual
knowledge questions). Respondents judged by the interviewer to be uninformed about politics, and who
exhibit a weak party{policy relationship, may misperceive party positions or be unaware of them. I credit
an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
22to override social issue cross-pressures among Blacks. In short, the design should take se-
riously both race and information as inuences on black partisanship. Does learning about
the partisan alignment of issues lead Black Americans to adopt more consistent partisan
attitudes, or is their allegiance to Democratic partisanship resistant to new information? To
what extent do the party's historical commitment to racial equality and Blacks' own sense
of racial group consciousness limit the impact of social issue cross-pressures, even among the
(newly) informed? Experimental evidence can bolster the more tentative answers oered
here.
23References
Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and
American Democracy. Yale University Press.
Althaus, Scott L. 2003. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and
the Will of the People. Cambridge University Press.
Bartels, Larry M. 1996. \Uninformed votes: Information eects in presidential elections."
American Journal of Political Science 40(1):194.
Claassen, Ryan L. and Benjamin Highton. 2009. \Policy Polarization among Party Elites and
the Signicance of Political Awareness in the Mass Public." Political Research Quarterly
62(3):538 { 551.
Converse, Phillip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology and
Discontent, ed. David E. Apter. New York, NY: Free Press pp. 206{261.
Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and
Why it Matters. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.
Ellison, Christopher G., Samuel Echevarra and Brad Smith. 2005. \Religion and Abor-
tion Attitudes Among U.S. Hispanics: Findings from the 1990 Latino National Political
Survey." Social Science Quarterly 86(1):192 { 208.
Frymer, Paul. 1999. Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America. Princeton,
NJ.: Princeton University Press.
Galston, William A. 2001. \Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Educa-
tion." Annual Review of Political Science 4(1):217{234.
Gilens, Martin. 2001. \Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences." American
Political Science Review 95(2):379.
Gilens, Martin and Naomi Murakawa. 2002. Elite Cues and Political Decision-Making. In
Research in Micropolitics: Political Decision-Making, Deliberation and Participation, ed.
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Leonie Huddy and Robert Shapiro. New York, NY.: JAI Press
pp. 15{50.
Green, D.P., B. Palmquist and E. Schickler. 2004. Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political
Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.
Hajnal, Zoltan and Taeku Lee. 2011. Why Americans Don't Join the Party: Race, Immi-
gration and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
24Harris, F.C. 1999. Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism.
Oxford University Press.
Harris-Lacewell, Melissa V. 2004. Barbershops, Bibles, and BET: Everyday Talk and Black
Political Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Kam, Cindy. 2005. \Who Toes the party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Dierences."
Political Behavior 27(2):163 { 182.
Kinder, Donald R. 2001. \Exploring the Racial Divide: Blacks, Whites, and Opinion on
National Policy." American Journal of Political Science 45(2):439.
Kuklinski, James H. and Norman L. Hurley. 1994. \On Hearing and Interpreting Political
Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking." The Journal of Politics 56(3):pp.
729{751.
Lauderdale, Benjamin E. 2010. \Does Congress Represent Public Opinion As It Is Or
As It Might Be?" Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association.
Layman, G. 2001. The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conict in American Party
Politics. New York, NY.: Columbia University Press.
Luskin, Robert C. 1987. \Measuring Political Sophistication." American Journal of Political
Science 31(4):pp. 856{899.
McDaniel, Eric L. and Christopher G. Ellison. 2008. \God's Party? Race, Religion, and
Partisanship over Time." Political Research Quarterly 61(2):180{191.
Philpot, Tasha S. 2007. Race, Republicans, & the return of the party of Lincoln. Ann Arbor,
MI.: University of Michigan Press.
Smith, R. Drew. 2005. Black Clergy and the Governmental Sector During George W. Bush's
Presidency. In Black Churches and Local Politics: Clergy Inuence, Organizational Part-
nerships, and Civic Empowerment, ed. R. Drew Smith and Frederick C. Harris. Lanham,
MD.: Rowman & Littleeld pp. 187{216.
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody and Phillip Tetlock. 1993. Reasoning and Choice:
Explorations in Political Psychology. New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press.
Tate, Katherine. 2010. What's Going On?: Political Incorporation and the Transformation
of Black Public Opinion. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Treier, Shawn and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2009. \The Nature of Political Ideology in the
Contemporary Electorate." Public Opinion Quarterly 73(4):679{703.
Van Knippenberg, Daan and Dancker Daamen. 1996. \Providing Information in Public
Opinion Surveys: Motivation and Ability Eects in the Information-and-Choice Question-
naire." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 8(1):70{82.
25Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
Zaller, John. 1986. \Analysis of Information Items in the 1985 ANES Pilot Study." ANES
Pilot Study Report, No. nes002261.
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York, NY.: Cambridge
University Press.
26Respondent Political Knowledge Grade
Variable A B C D F
Partisan Attitudes
Party Identication 5.89 6.00 6.04 5.80 5.80
[1(Strong Republican), 7(Strong Democrat)] (1.57) (1.50) (1.51) (1.70) (1.72)
Bush{Kerry Favorability -3.81 -3.65 -3.44 -3.15 -2.49
[-10, +10] (4.05) (3.95) (3.79) (4.02) (3.91)
Approve Bush Job Performance .17 .19 .20 .24 .24
Vote for Bush .09 .11 .09 .09 .12
Social Issues
Abortion Ban 2.14 2.27 2.33 2.52 2.71
[1(Strong Oppose), 5(Strong Favor)] (1.52) (1.59) (1.63) (1.66) (1.74)
Gay Marriage Ban 2.62 2.80 2.73 2.70 2.94
[1(Strong Oppose), 5(Strong Favor)] (1.74) (1.76) (1.77) (1.73) (1.78)
School Vouchers 2.93 3.12 3.30 3.41 3.45
[1(Strong Oppose), 5(Strong Favor)] (1.76) (1.73) (1.72) (1.69) (1.70)
Favor Feminists 5.80 5.97 5.80 5.88 5.35
[0,10] (2.70) (2.63) (2.76) (2.866) (3.13)
Favor Gay Groups 3.86 3.61 3.12 3.00 2.90
[0,10] (3.04) (3.24) (3.14) (3.23) (3.16)
Ideology 2.91 3.00 3.10 3.13 3.27
[1(Very Liberal), 5(Very Conservative)] (.96) (1.02) (1.04) (1.09) (1.19)
Number of Respondents 1383 2105 1873 812 353
Table 1: Variable Descriptions. 2004 National Annenberg Election Study, Rolling Cross-
Section. Cell entries in Columns 2{6 are means (standard deviations), by interviewer's assessment
of respondent's level of political knowledge. Black Respondents only.
27Religious Tradition Church Attendance Low Knowledge High Knowledge
Not Evangelical
Less Than 1/week 0/24 17/24
At Least 1/week 2/24 8/24
Proportion Signicant 0.042 0.521
Evangelical
Less Than 1/week 1/24 11/24
At Least 1/week 4/24 23/24
Proportion Signicant 0.104 0.708
Table 2: Number of Statistically Signicant Policy-Party Relationships. Cell entries
are the number of statistically signicant (p< :05) relationships between policy opinion (Ideology,
Abortion, Gay Marriage, Vouchers, Feminist Favorability, Gay Favorability) and partisan attitude
(Party Identication, Bush Approval, Bush Vote, Bush{Kerry Favorability). The denominator in
each cell is the total number of estimated policy{party relationships for the given subgroup of
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Figure 1: Social Issue Positions and Partisan Attitudes: Estimated Dierences: Graph
(a) presents the rst dierence estimates for party identication associated with the 25th versus the
75th percentile position on ideology (ideo), abortion (abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers
(voucher), and the favorability of feminists (fem) and gay and lesbian groups (gays). Graphs (b),
(c), and (d) present these estimates for Bush relative favorability, job approval and vote intention.
All estimates are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean
















































Figure 2: Social Issue Positions and Party Identication, by Political Knowledge:
Estimated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for party identication
associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo), abortion (abort),
gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists (fem) and gay and
lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on the level of political knowledge (Grade A
thru F), and are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean
















































Figure 3: Social Issue Positions and Bush Favorability, by Political Knowledge: Es-
timated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for Bush relative favorability
associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo), abortion (abort),
gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists (fem) and gay and
lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on the level of political knowledge (Grade A
thru F), and are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean
















































Figure 4: Social Issue Positions and Bush Job Approval, by Political Knowledge: Esti-
mated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for the probability of Bush job
approval associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo), abortion
(abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists (fem)
and gay and lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on the level of political knowl-
edge (Grade A thru F), and are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held
















































Figure 5: Social Issue Positions and Bush Vote, by Political Knowledge: Estimated
Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for the probability of voting for Bush
associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo), abortion (abort),
gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists (fem) and gay and
lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on the level of political knowledge (Grade A
thru F), and are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean
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Born−Again and Evangelicals Only
Figure 6: Social Issue Positions and Party Identication, by Issue Salience and Political
Knowledge: Estimated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for party
identication associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo),
abortion (abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists
(fem) and gay and lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on religious tradition (Non-
Evangelical, Evangelical), the frequency of church attendance (at least once per week, less than once
per week) and the level of political knowledge (better than Grade C, Grade C or less), and are
calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean values. The 95%
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Born−Again and Evangelicals Only
Figure 7: Social Issue Positions and Bush Favorability, by Issue Salience and Political
Knowledge: Estimated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for Bush
relative favorability associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo),
abortion (abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists
(fem) and gay and lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on religious tradition (Non-
Evangelical, Evangelical), the frequency of church attendance (at least once per week, less than once
per week) and the level of political knowledge (better than Grade C, Grade C or less), and are
calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean values. The 95%



















































































































































Born−Again and Evangelicals Only
Figure 8: Social Issue Positions and Bush Job Approval, by Issue Salience and Po-
litical Knowledge: Estimated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for
the probability of Bush job approval associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position
on ideology (ideo), abortion (abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the
favorability of feminists (fem) and gay and lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional
on religious tradition (Non-Evangelical, Evangelical), the frequency of church attendance (at least
once per week, less than once per week) and the level of political knowledge (better than Grade C,
Grade C or less), and are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant



















































































































































Born−Again and Evangelicals Only
Figure 9: Social Issue Positions and Bush Vote, by Issue Salience and Political Knowl-
edge: Estimated Dierences: Graph presents the rst dierence estimates for the probability
of voting for Bush associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile position on ideology (ideo),
abortion (abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of femi-
nists (fem) and gay and lesbian groups (gays). The estimates are conditional on religious tradition
(Non-Evangelical, Evangelical), the frequency of church attendance (at least once per week, less
than once per week) and the level of political knowledge (better than Grade C, Grade C or less),
and are calculated with demographic covariates and interview date held constant at mean values.









































































































































































































































































Figure 10: Social Issue Positions and Partisan Attitudes, by Political Knowledge:
Estimated Dierences: Graph (a) presents the rst dierence estimates for party identication
associated with the 25th versus the 75th percentile Black position on ideology (ideo), abortion
(abort), gay marriage (marr), school vouchers (voucher), and the favorability of feminists (fem)
and gay and lesbian groups (gays). Graphs (b), (c), and (d) present these estimates for Bush
relative favorability, job approval and vote intention. The estimates are conditional on the level
of political knowledge (Grade A thru F), and are calculated with demographic covariates and
interview date held constant at mean values. The 95% condence intervals are also displayed.
White respondents only
38